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ABSTRACT 
During recent years the so-called left turn across the Latin American continent has 
stimulated research seeking to explain this resurgence, accompanied by a lively debate 
about distinct variants of the left, broadly conceived as “good” and “bad,” social 
democratic and populist. This paper goes beyond this simplistic distinction: It explores 
the substantive policy content of left and right in Latin American countries using 
original expert survey data of policy positions of political parties and presidents in 18 
countries and furthermore compares these left-right estimates with results from elite 
surveys. The examples discussed underscore the need to take policy positions on 
particular policy dimensions into account and show that caution is recommended in the 
use of the general left-right axis.  
 
 
RESUMEN 
 
En los últimos años, el llamado giro a la izquierda a lo largo del continente 
latinoamericano estimuló investigaciones que trataron de explicar este resurgimiento, 
acompañadas de un debate vivaz sobre las distintas variantes de la izquierda, concebidas 
en general como buena y mala, social demócrata y populista. Este artículo va más allá de 
esta distinción simplista. Explora la cuestión del contenido de políticas sustantivo de la 
derecha y la izquierda en los países latinoamericanos usando datos de encuesta 
originales sobre las posiciones de política de los partidos y los presidentes en 18 países 
y, además, compara estas estimaciones de posiciones de derecha y de izquierda con los 
resultados de encuestas a elites. Los ejemplos discutidos subrayan la necesidad de tomar 
en cuenta las posiciones respecto de dimensiones de política particulares y muestran que 
es recomendable ser cautos en el uso del eje general izquierda-derecha. 
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“When I use a word,” Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a scornful tone, “it 
means just what I choose it to mean—neither more nor less.” “The 
question is,” said Alice, “whether you can make words mean so many 
different things.” “The question is,” said Humpty Dumpty, “which is to 
be master—that’s all.”  
—Lewis Carroll Through the Looking-Glass 
 
During recent years left-wing parties and leaders gained access to governments in a 
series of elections in Latin American countries. By and large these victories were 
observed with a certain amount of suspicion, chiefly on account of the advanced anti-
neoliberal stances of the elected leaders and their cherishing of links with Cuba. The 
scholarly community, somewhat puzzled by the events, quickly engaged in a lively 
debate, or rather in two lively debates, on the phenomenon also dubbed the “left-turn”: 
classifying the left in Latin America and explaining the resurgence of parties and leaders 
on the left. 
On the one hand, elected leftist candidates were very soon perceived to be far 
from a homogeneous group across the region, and many authors started to engage in 
discussions about classifications within the Latin American left. Most prominently 
discussed is the juxtaposition of “good” left vs. “bad” left:—of radicals vs. moderates 
and populists vs. social democrats, who tend to be categorized into those who embrace 
neoliberal market policies and those who fiercely oppose them (Castañeda 2004, 2006; 
but also Panizza 2005; Schamis 2006). While some have recently suggested further 
ramifications into three (Walker 2008) and even four distinct lefts (Levitsky and Roberts 
forthcoming), other authors emphasize common grounds among left-wing parties, 
movements, and leaders, such as the promotion of social inclusion.  
The focus on programmatic similarities, on the other hand, is the starting point 
for scholars who wish to explain what motivated the left turn across the region in the 
first place. In this line of reasoning the shift to the left is viewed as a consequence of 
failures of the neoliberal/liberal-democratic paradigm (Cameron 2009; Luna and 
Filgueira 2009). Voters turned to the left out of their growing frustration and 
disappointment with representative democracy (Mainwaring 2006; Roberts 2007), to 
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punish neoliberal incumbents for their poor economic performance (Arnold and Samuels 
forthcoming; Panizza 2005), or as a general reaction to the perils of globalization, 
granting the left a “moderate mandate” (Baker and Greene 2009) to “re-equilibrate” 
economies in order to cushion negative effects for those hurt by market-oriented reforms 
(Stokes 2009; see also Debs and Helmke 2008 on inequality). 
This paper aims at contributing to both lines of research by exploring the 
substantive meaning of left and right in Latin America with the help of expert surveys of 
policy positions of political parties and presidents in 18 Latin American countries. 
Results from recent elite survey data have shown that political elites in Latin America 
have a clear and coherent understanding of the ideological meaning of left and right 
(Alcántara 2004; Zoco 2006). Furthermore, Colomer (2005) demonstrates that most 
Latin American electorates are consistently located on the general left-right dimension, 
and Wiesehomeier and Benoit (2009) identify a primary axis of political competition of 
left-right. However, as reflected in the ongoing debates, it is much more difficult to pin 
down the precise policy content of this axis.  
Left and right are labels and their specific content may differ. Huber and 
Inglehart (1995) show that in the 42 countries where they administered their open-ended 
expert survey to measure left and right, political conflict indeed tends to be structured 
along this single dimension. However, they conclude that the left-right dimension “is an 
amorphous vessel whose meaning varies in systematic ways with the underlying 
political and economic conditions in a given society” (Huber and Inglehart 1995, 90). It 
is precisely this variation that is neglected by the attempt to classify the left in Latin 
America, and my results show that the meaning of this general axis is highly context—
i.e., country—dependent. This raises concerns for both the ongoing discussion of 
classifications of the left and cross-national comparisons based on this scale.  
The paper proceeds as follows: After briefly describing the expert survey, the 
paper compares presidential positioning on the general left-right dimension, showing 
considerable dispersion within the left. These differences are examined further in the 
subsequent section with the help of a two-dimensional representation of the overall left-
right in socioeconomic terms, a descriptive comparison that already hints at fundamental 
differences among countries. Building on findings by Wiesehomeier and Benoit (2009), 
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the paper then moves on to explore the substantive policy content of left and right in the 
expert survey results in each country. Finally, in order to validate my measures, I 
directly compare the estimates from the expert survey with those derived by the 
Parliamentary Elites in Latin America (PELA) project from elite surveys, showing 
substantial agreement. The last section summarizes the exploratory analysis. 
 
A NEW EXPERT SURVEY OF POLICY POSITIONS 
 
The estimates used in this paper come from an expert survey of policy positions of 
political parties and presidents in 18 Latin American countries conducted by 
Wiesehomeier and Benoit (2009) in late 2006 and early 2007.1 This survey, where the 
typical expert was an academic specializing in the political parties and electoral politics 
of the country in question, yielded estimates for 146 political parties and 18 presidents 
on up to 11 primary policy dimensions per country.2 Political parties were identified 
following the general criteria applied in Benoit and Laver (2006) and Laver and Hunt 
(1992).3 The survey included every existing party that won seats in the lower chamber in 
the country’s most recent election, parties that won at least 1 percent of the vote, and 
additional parties that despite not meeting the above criteria were judged to be politically 
important by local experts. Very straightforwardly, presidents were simply those in 
office at the time the survey was deployed.  
Substantive policy dimensions covered can be identified as three sets to be 
applied on a country-by-country basis. Following Benoit and Laver (2006), a hard core 
of four policy dimensions was included in the questionnaire and deployed in every 
country:  
• Economic policy (interpreted as the trade-off between lower taxes and higher 
public spending)  
• Social policy (interpreted as policies on matters such as abortion, divorce, 
homosexuality, and euthanasia)  
• The decentralization of decision-making  
• Environmental policy (interpreted as the trade-off between environmental 
protection and economic growth)4  
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A further set that can be understood as core dimensions for Latin America was 
identified and also deployed in every country. These are issues in general considered to 
be of key interest for politics and political competition in Latin American and relate to:  
• Religious principles in politics  
• Globalization  
• Regional Economic Cooperation  
• Deregulation or Privatization5  
 
The last group of policy dimensions comprised issues that applied to subsets of 
countries or only to individual country contexts. This included questions about the 
promotion of minority rights and rights of indigenous people, security and individual 
liberties, party regulation or the use of family remittances. For each substantive policy 
dimension experts were presented with two different types of 20-point scales. The first 
one related to the position a political actor is judged to take on the policy dimension in 
question, with the lower endpoint, 1, generally corresponding to “left” positioning and 
the higher, 20, to “right.” The second scale, in turn, related to the importance an actor 
attaches to a policy dimension and also ran from 1 (not important at all) to 20 (very 
important).  
In addition to these specific policy dimensions and particularly interesting for the 
aim of this paper, the survey also included a direct measure of positions on a general 
left-right scale, on which experts were asked to locate political actors “taking all aspects 
of party policy into account.” As we will see in the following, this makes it possible for 
us to directly compare left-right positioning of presidents throughout the region. 
Moreover, as the interpretation of the generic notion of left and right was left to the 
country specialists, these directly measured positions allow us to further explore the 
meaning of this widely employed scale in specific national contexts.  
 
POLICY POSITIONING IN LATIN AMERICA 
 
Many observers of Latin American politics have commented on the “rise of the left” 
during recent years, especially in regard to presidential elections and the number of left 
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leaders elected into government. It seems appropriate then to explore policy positioning 
in this region, starting with a look at how country experts judged the presidents in office 
to be positioned on this general scale at the time the survey was deployed. Before we 
turn our attention to the substantive meaning of left and right, however, it is instructive 
to contrast this one-dimensional dichotomy with a two-dimensional interpretation of this 
scale in socioeconomic terms.  
 
Presidents on the General Left-Right Dimension 
 
Figure 1 shows presidential positioning on the general left-right dimension running from 
1 (left) to 20 (right) with a dashed line indicating its midpoint at 10.5. When comparing 
positions country experts ascribed to presidents in the 18 Latin American countries 
under consideration, by and large we are not confronted with big surprises. Presidents 
span almost the entire range of this unidimensional representation. With a mean score of 
2.65, the Venezuelan president Hugo Chávez is clearly the the most “leftist” leader in 
the region, while Alvaro Uribe from Colombia is judged to occupy the most 
conservative position with a mean score of 18.2.  
 
 
FIGURE 1 
 
 
PRESIDENTIAL POSITIONING IN LATIN AMERICA ON THE 
GENERAL LEFT-RIGHT DIMENSION 
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Nevertheless, one of the first points that stands out is the overall distribution 
along the left-right continuum. Despite the “red tide” that swept through Latin America, 
talk about “the continent of the left” back in 2006 clearly seems to have been overstated. 
Of the 18 presidents in office at the time the survey was deployed only 8 are positioned 
to the left of the scale’s midpoint, whereas we find 10 presidents to the right, which 
leaves us with a regional mean of 10.90.6  
When we focus on the 8 left-wing presidents, it also becomes evident that 
between leaders usually lumped together in the same group of radicals or moderates we 
actually find considerable political space reflected in the scores they receive. Take, for 
instance, Hugo Chávez, Peronist leader Néstor Kirchner, and Evo Morales, who often 
have been judged to form the group of national-populist leaders or, to put it differently, 
taken as examples of the “bad” or “wrong” left (Castañeda 2004, 2006).7 However, the 
mean expert placements of their positions on the general left-right scale differ 
substantively. While the Venezuelan president is judged to be the most left-leaning 
leader in the region, Bolivia’s Evo Morales, though clearly a leftist leader, is assumed to 
be more moderate with a score of 3.87. The former Argentinean president in turn 
receives a center-left rating of 8.35. Likewise the positions of the presidents of Ecuador 
and Nicaragua, who have also been generally perceived abroad as radicals during their 
countries’ election processes, differ substantially. While Rafael Correa is judged to be 
clearly on the left with a score of 4.2, the Sandinista leader Daniel Ortega, with a mean 
of 8.55, is actually ranked as being the most moderate representative of the left-wing 
leaders.  
We see less pronounced but similar variation in the group of presidents usually 
assumed to represent the moderate left: Chile’s Michelle Bachelet, Brazil’s Luis Inácio 
“Lula” da Silva, and Uruguay’s Tabaré Vázquez. The former Chilean president, who has 
frequently been described as a moderate social democratic politician, is assigned the 
most leftist position with an expert judgment score of 6.23, followed by Tabaré Vázquez 
with a mean placement of 6.64, and Lula with a center-left score of 8.15.  
Thus, we find considerable dispersion among the so-called left-wing presidents 
even when split into clusters of moderates and radicals. Nevertheless, although there 
might exist a rather uniform view or idea of what political left represents, it is also true 
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that the political context shapes labels like “left” and “right” and their use. The general 
left-right dimension thus has “no fixed definition in terms of its substantive policy 
content” (Benoit and Laver 2006, 131), and it is likely that the relative contribution of 
specific policy areas to the meaning of this concept differs from country to country, 
thereby influencing the overall left-right position of an actor. Before we examine such 
country differences with exploratory regression analyses in detail, we take an 
intermediate step and use a two-dimensional representation of the general left-right axis 
to illustrate this concern. 
From One to Two Dimensions  
 
Probably the most common way to understand the conflict axis of left and right is as a 
description of the socioeconomic policy positions of political actors. From a comparative 
perspective, we can use the results from our expert survey and map experts’ scores of 
party positions in a two-dimensional space of more specific economic and social policy 
dimensions.  
We use a simple scatterplot of political parties and presidents in Latin American 
countries. Figure 2 shows positioning on the deregulation/privatization dimension, 
indicating economic left-right, and on the social policy dimension, which can also be 
understood as moral liberalism, indicating positioning on issues such as divorce, gay 
rights, and abortion.8 For ease of inspection, the figure also plots a fitted linear 
regression with a 95 percent confidence interval and large cross hairs intersecting at the 
midpoints, partitioning the scatterplot into quadrants.  
First we notice that presidents and parties seem to lie along the fitted line 
indicating one underlying dimension. A closer look, moreover, shows that the scatterplot 
of economic vs. social policy positions reveals several interesting features of the 
political landscape in Latin America. 
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FIGURE 2 
 
 
SCATTERPLOT OF POLICY POSITIONING IN LATIN AMERICA IN A 
SOCIO-ECONOMIC POLICY SPACE 
 
 
 
Not surprisingly, the location of the vast majority of actors on the moral 
liberalism dimension reflects the high level of conservatism we find in the region. The 
overwhelming majority of parties and presidents appear to significantly oppose liberal 
policies on homosexuality, divorce, and abortion, issues that are still fiercely debated in 
some parts of Latin America. For instance, while the legalization of abortion, at least for 
therapeutic reason such as danger to the woman’s life, is slowly gaining ground 
throughout the region, Chile, El Salvador, and the Dominican Republic do not provide 
for exceptions and abortion remains illegal. Chile and Uruguay are good examples of the 
conflictive nature of these topics. In Chile in November 2006 a legislative initiative put 
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forward by two legislators, one of whom belonged to the presidential party Partido 
Socialista (Socialist Party, or PS), was rejected in the Chilean Congress also by large 
parts of legislators backing the presidential coalition, the Concertación. In Uruguay in 
November 2008 President Tabaré Vázquez vetoed a bill aimed at decriminalizing 
abortion, which had originally been introduced by the president’s own coalition. In the 
aftermath of this event the president resigned from his own party.  
Turning to the positioning of political actors on the economic left-right, Latin 
America appears to be relatively more equally distributed between both camps. If we 
look at presidential positioning only, however, the continent appears to be split into half: 
we find nine presidents to the “left” of the economic scale and nine to the “right.” While 
the latter nine are also found exclusively on the “right” of the moral liberalism 
dimension, the four presidents from Bolivia, Nicaragua, Paraguay, and Uruguay, 
together with a few parties, are situated in the upper, left quadrant. This combination—
left on economic issues but quite conservative on social issues—is rather idiosyncratic 
for Latin America, as in most other contexts this quadrant usually is empty. Conversely, 
in most democracies the classic “liberal” party would be in the lower right quadrant: left 
on moral liberalism, right on the economy. However, the data indicate that for Latin 
American countries this quadrant is virtually empty: mostly empty of parties and 
completely empty of presidents.  
This simple two-dimensional representation shows the problems that arise when 
we try to categorize actors on a single left-right continuum. Typically attached to the 
opposing poles on such a scale will be combinations from aspects like government 
intervention, equality, liberal views on social and moral matters, and a general 
propensity towards tolerance of change on the left vs. laissez-faire economic policies, 
inequality, socially and morally conservative views, and a general tendency towards 
preserving the status quo on the right. If we collapse the socioeconomic interpretation of 
left-right into one combined scale (having in mind what is commonly understood as 
“left” and “right”), it is pretty straightforward to locate the quadrants on the diagonal 
onto this single dimension. With the off-diagonal quadrants, by contrast, this is not such 
an easy endeavor. Classical liberalism understood as a combination of support for 
progressive social policies and economic government intervention—our lower right 
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quadrant—“has no unambiguous place on a left-right socioeconomic scale” (Benoit and 
Laver 2006, 132). More important for our example is that the same applies to the upper 
left quadrant which combines the moralist approach to social issues of the conservative 
with support for government economic intervention. 
Consider as an example Uruguayan President Tabaré Vázquez and former 
Paraguayan President Nicanor Duarte. Both actors are judged rather similarly on the two 
dimensions represented by the scatterplot. They have almost identical positions on the 
combined deregulation/privatization dimension (scores of 6.6 and 6.7 respectively) and 
as well are very closely positioned to each other on the dimension representing issues 
concerning abortion, homosexuality, and divorce (12.6 and 14.7 respectively). Yet, as 
can be seen in the figure of presidential positioning on the general left-right dimension 
(see Figure 1), with a left-right mean of 6.6, Uraguay’s Vázquez is clearly considered a 
leftist whereas Paraguay’s Duarte is considered to be on the right with a left-right mean 
of 14.4. Such a difference might stem from country-specific contexts and country-
specific interpretations, from what country experts have in mind in substantive terms 
when they locate parties on the general left-right, applying local left-right semantics.  
Thus, not only does Latin America appear to lack classic liberal parties, but also 
it seems to contain an unusual breed of “anti-liberal” parties and presidents: right on 
social policy yet left on economics, possibly reflecting the fierce anti–Washington 
Consensus discourse common in the region. It might be the case that the location on the 
general left-right axis depends on the relative importance of such topics to the local 
meaning of left and right. To tackle this question, in the next section we will use the 
results of the expert survey to explore the relative contribution of different policy areas 
to the overall left-right dimension.  
 
SUBSTANTIVE MEANING OF LEFT AND RIGHT 
 
In our survey experts were asked to give not only their judgments of the positions of 
presidents and parties on substantive policy dimensions but also to judge the positions of 
the same political actors on the general left-right scale. We can use this information to 
analyze the relationship of the substantive policy dimensions with the general left-right 
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scale and thus to analyze the possibility that the substantive content of this dimension 
varies depending on the specific country context.  
As we have seen, the survey applied two different sets of core dimensions in 
every country—Benoit and Laver’s hard core of four substantive policy dimensions and 
four dimensions of special interest for policy competition in the Latin American context. 
In their exploratory analysis Wiesehomeier and Benoit (2009) employ the data reduction 
method of factor analysis on these eight key issues and show that positioning on these 
issues explains nearly half (0.45, or 45 percent) of the variance on an underlying 
common dimension represented by the first factor.9 Except for decentralization and 
economic cooperation, which emerge as principal components of a second orthogonal 
factor, all dimensions load strongly on this first factor. Using the factor scores for each 
president and party from the factor analysis and contrasting these scored positions with 
the independent left-right placements of the same actors, the authors conclude that “[t]he 
results provide strong, undeniable evidence that the first dimension may be interpreted 
as the left-right dimension of politics in Latin America” (Wiesehomeier and Benoit 
2009, 1440).  
The finding of an underlying left-right axis in Latin American politics is 
remarkable. However, the strategic meaning in terms of a primary axis of political 
competition is very different from the substantive meaning this general dimension might 
have in individual countries. To explore this question further we will therefore use the 
six policy dimensions identified by the authors—deregulation/privatization, 
globalization, environmental policy, social policy, religious principles, and taxes vs. 
spending—to examine and contrast the association of experts’ placements of presidents 
and parties on these substantive policy dimensions with experts’ placements of the same 
actors on the general left-right in each country context.  
Table 1 shows the results from weighted OLS regressions for each of the 18 
Latin American countries, where the dependent variable is the expert placement of the 
party or president on the general left-right scale and the independent variables are the 
placements of the same expert on the specific policy dimensions indicated in the 
headings. Cases, that is, a placement of a political actor by a country specialist, were 
weighted with the vote share won in the election closest to the time of the expert survey, 
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and each row reports standardized coefficients. In the spirit of our two-dimensional 
representation in the preceding section, the first row of each country panel shows 
estimates predicting positioning on the left-right scale from positioning of the same 
actors on the economic and social policy dimensions. All coefficients are positive in 
sign, meaning that social conservatism and a preference for deregulation and 
privatization respectively are attached to local definitions of the policital right.10 
In general, placements of parties and presidents on the general left-right scale can 
be predicted pretty well from their placements on both substantive policy dimensions. In 
Bolivia, for instance, about 66 percent of the variation in the country expert placements 
on the left-right can be explained by placements on these two dimensions, albeit it seems 
that what best explains this variation is effectively positioning on the deregulation 
dimension. Other countries where the combined deregulation/privatization dimension 
best predicts placements are Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Peru. In 
other cases, such as Brazil or Venezuela, both economic and social policy are needed to 
explain variation on the left-right axis. However, in these countries the 
deregulation/privatization dimension clearly dominates the left-right placements, 
whereas in Argentina and Chile experts’ placements on both dimensions contribute to 
the general left-right positions in almost equal measure. 
Remember our discussion of the policy positions of Tabaré Vázquez and Nicanor 
Duarte on economic left-right vs. moral liberalism as illustrated by the scatterplot in 
Figure 2. We have seen that despite being judged quite similarly on these individual 
scales, both presidents receive strikingly different mean expert judgments on the general 
left-right dimension depicted in Figure 1. A look at the regression estimates indicates 
why this may be the case: In Paraguay social policies have a greater—effectively 
exclusive—impact on predictions on the general left-right axis.11 In Uruguay, in contrast, 
the impact of the deregulation/privatization dimension clearly prevails. However, 
whereas in the latter country placements of political actors on both dimensions explain a 
substantial part of the variation (81 percent) in their placements on the left-right scale, 
this is certainly not the case in Paraguay. Only 12 percent of the variation in the 
placements by Paraguayan country experts of parties and the president on the left-right  
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TABLE 1 
 
 
WEIGHTED OLS REGRESSIONS PREDICTING LEFT-RIGHT POSITIONS 
 
Country 
Deregulatio
n Social Taxes Religion 
Environmen
t Globalization 
Root  
MSE 
Adjusted 
R2 
ARG 0.512*** 0.444***     2.364 0.751 
ARG 0.373*** 0.291*** 0.184*** 0.184***   2.186 0.785 
ARG 0.151*** 0.226*** 0.038 0.120*** 0.114*** 0.429*** 1.788 0.854 
         
BOL 0.826*** 0.069     3.383 0.659 
BOL 0.801*** 0.005 0.114 0.061   2.796 0.749 
BOL 0.144 0.024 0.079 0.044 -0.013 0.741*** 2.375 0.820 
         
BRA 0.621*** 0.288***     2.548 0.649 
BRA 0.590*** 0.287*** 0.081 -0.048   2.300 0.718 
BRA 0.425*** 0.201*** 0.007 -0.106*** 0.222*** 0.211*** 2.127 0.746 
         
CHL 0.498*** 0.477***     2.539 0.776 
CHL 0.307*** 0.258*** 0.223*** 0.283***   2.198 0.832 
CHL 0.264*** 0.267*** 0.195*** 0.273*** 0.028 0.101** 2.252 0.827 
         
COL 0.712*** 0.235***     2.803 0.655 
COL 0.477*** -0.009 -0.018 0.517***   2.190 0.796 
COL 0.271*** 0.025 -0.015 0.303*** 0.233*** 0.243*** 1.862 0.853 
         
CRI 0.855*** -0.068     2.538 0.680 
CRI 0.687*** -0.070 0.190** 0.197**   2.129 0.757 
CRI 0.252** -0.150 0.151** 0.131 0.473*** 0.178 1.761 0.834 
         
DOM 0.423** 0.412**     2.160 0.275 
DOM 0.455** 0.266 -0.344 0.598**   1.949 0.410 
DOM 0.449 0.260 -0.358 0.575** 0.122 -0.015 2.013 0.370 
         
ECU 0.811*** 0.220***     2.025 0.904 
ECU 0.788*** 0.139 0.129** 0.007   1.809 0.922 
ECU 0.311 0.379*** 0.226** -0.127*** 0.096 0.105 0.820 0.981 
         
GTM 0.684*** 0.030     3.302 0.467 
GTM 0.610*** -0.145 0.114 0.341***   2.805 0.581 
GTM 0.270 -0.258** -0.168 0.518*** 0.140 0.450 2.607 0.653 
         
HND 0.806*** 0.060     2.420 0.643 
HND 0.911** 0.070 -0.086 -0.134   2.633 0.577 
HND 0.311 0.048 0.000 -0.121 0.449*** 0.475*** 1.198 0.912 
         
MEX 0.597*** 0.363***     2.360 0.801 
MEX 0.560*** 0.334*** -0.097** 0.099   2.310 0.810 
MEX 0.259*** 0.312*** -0.090*** 0.019 0.060 0.460*** 1.711 0.894 
         
NIC 0.765*** 0.079     3.874 0.621 
NIC 0.684*** 0.014 0.314*** 0.196   3.342 0.717 
NIC 0.365*** 0.028 0.159** 0.211** 0.091 0.410*** 2.866 0.792 
         
PAN 0.211 0.618***     2.728 0.532 
PAN 0.170 0.665*** 0.058 0.094   2.310 0.635 
PAN 0.231 0.632*** 0.016 0.112 0.087 -0.114 2.270 0.640 
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Table 1 continued 
PER 0.810*** 0.071     2.228 0.677 
PER 0.728*** -0.001 0.024 0.168**   2.060 0.668 
PER 0.447*** -0.012 0.038 0.216*** 0.185** 0.197** 1.906 0.714 
         
PRY 0.209 0.329***     3.481 0.125 
PRY 0.390*** 0.178 0.442*** 0.521***   2.862 0.450 
PRY 0.231 0.092 0.357*** 0.426*** 0.185 0.233 2.769 0.464 
         
SLV 0.843*** 0.151**     1.660 0.942 
SLV 0.729*** 0.104 0.054 0.148***   1.459 0.956 
SLV 0.601*** 0.085 0.011 0.129** 0.195** 0.031 1.370 0.962 
         
URY 0.817*** 0.150***     1.790 0.811 
URY 0.663*** 0.131** 0.229*** -0.015   1.695 0.831 
URY 0.574*** 0.015 0.151** -0.012 0.181*** 0.224** 1.308 0.897 
         
VEN 0.774*** 0.172***     2.229 0.747 
VEN 0.667*** 0.111** 0.137*** 0.169***   2.027 0.791 
VEN 0.435*** 0041 0.127*** 0.167*** 0.075 0.301*** 1.895 0.813 
 
*** p<0.01, **p<0.05 
Each row reports standardized coefficients for weighted OLS regressions where the dependent variable is the expert 
placement of the party or president on the general left-right scale and the independent variables are the placements of the 
same expert on the specific policy dimensions indicated in the headings. Cases were weighted with the vote share won in 
the election closest to the time of the expert survey. 
 
 
dimension can be explained by the placements of the same actors on the social and 
economic policy dimensions. It appears likely that in this case we are missing something 
that forms part, at least in the minds of the country specialists, of the substantial 
interpretation of left and right. 
It may be that in a specific country like Paraguay we need something more to 
capture economic and social policy. One issue that springs to mind in the Latin 
American context is the dimension of religious principles in politics. Many scholars of 
Latin American politics will undoubtly consider this issue to be a relevant dimension of 
competition, and as we have seen, Wiesehomeier and Benoit (2009) indeed show that it 
also provides a strong component of positioning on the overall left-right dimension on a 
regional level. Although the religious principles in politics dimension and the social 
policy dimension understood as indicating positioning on matters on divorce, gay rights, 
and abortion most certainly will overlap, they capture quite different aspects of social 
policy. Similarly, the dimension of deregulation and privatization captures a quite 
different aspect of economic government intervention from the dimension measuring 
economic policy interpreted as the trade-off between lower taxes and higher public 
spending.  
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The second row of each country panel in Table 1 shows the results of adding 
these alternative manifestations of social and economic policy as independent variables. 
With the exception of Bolivia, Brazil, Honduras, and Panama, positioning on either or 
both of taxes vs. spending and religious principles contribute significantly to positioning 
on the overall left-right. Only in Argentina, Chile, and Venezuela are all four substantive 
policy dimensions needed to predict left-right placements, but including the two 
additional policy dimensions improves our ability to predict expert left-right placements 
considerably in all 18 Latin American countries. For instance, in Paraguay we see that 
now 45 percent of all the variation in the placements of parties and the president on the 
left-right dimension can be explained by these four dimensions.  
Not only does the predictive power change notably but, furthermore, in most of 
the cases we see major shifts in the relative contributions of the regression coefficients. 
In almost all of the 18 countries we are investigating the impact of the 
deregulation/privatization dimension declines; however, it remains the best predictor of 
expert judgments on the general left-right in the vast majority of cases. In contrast, the 
taxes vs. spending dimension adds rather little to our ability to predict left-right positions 
but does so significantly in half of the countries in the region. The impact on the social 
policy dimension interpreted as moral liberalism is far more dramatic. In the Dominican 
Republic and Peru the religious dimension clearly captures an aspect not represented by 
the social policy dimension, whereas in Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala, and 
Paraguay the impact of the social policy dimension is replaced. Furthermore, in 
Colombia, the Dominican Republic, and Paraguay experts’ judgments on religious 
principles in politics are now the main predictors of left-right placement of presidents 
and parties.  
As a last step we will add two substantive dimensions that can be deemed 
somewhat different from the ones discussed so far. There has been much discussion 
about the changing nature of the meaning of left and right (see Benoit and Laver 2006, 
2007). New dimensions of substantive policy may develop and change the salience of 
policy dimensions that contribute to the meaning of left and right. The most prominent 
example that comes into mind is the importance that environmental policies have gained 
in advanced democracies and also in some Latin American countries where political 
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actors like green parties have sprung to life. Thinking of the post–Washington 
Consensus era in Latin America, in a similar way we can consider the issue of 
globalization as an important policy dimension dividing the left and the right, much 
more so than would be the case in, for instance, Western European countries. Although 
it may be primarily associated with redistributional consequences in Latin America, the 
globalization dimension is likely to capture some quite different social and cultural 
aspects.  
We can see the effects of adding policy positioning of parties and presidents on 
environmental policy and globalization to the weighted OLS regressions in the third and 
therefore last row of each country panel in Table 1. The results show that in Latin 
American countries concerns such as maintaining a clean and healthy environment now 
form a substantial component of expert judgments of placements on the left-right. Out of 
the eight countries where this is the case, in Costa Rica, Honduras, and to a lesser extent 
in Colombia and Brazil, environmental policy shows a considerably contribution. It 
comes as no surprise that in the case of Costa Rica positioning on this substantive policy 
dimension emerges as the best predictor of positioning on the overall left-right 
dimension. 
Nevertheless, including these two additional policy dimensions most clearly 
affects the coefficients of the combined deregulation/privatization dimension. In all 
country regressions the impact of this policy dimension declines considerably—in the 
cases of Argentina, Mexico, and Nicaragua the coefficient is more or less cut in half. In 
11 countries experts’ judgments of positions on the globalization dimension are an 
important predictor of left-right judgments and in the majority of cases with a rather 
considerable impact. The country that certainly stands out in this respect is Bolivia. In 
this case adding positioning on taxes vs. spending and religious principles did not 
change the fact that deregulation was the best predictor. However, in the last row of the 
country panel we see a striking effect: now 82 percent of the variation that can be 
explained in the placements made by Bolivian country specialists of Bolivian parties and 
the president on the left-right dimension is entirely attributable to the globalization 
dimension.12 A very similar pattern can be found in Honduras, although due to the low 
response rate in this case, the results should probably be taken with a grain of salt.  
 Wiesehomeier   17 
 
It is eye-catching that in the countries where the globalization dimension emerges 
as an important predictor of positioning on the general left-right, the vast majority are 
led by leftists. These results seem to underpin interpretations that see in the amelioration 
of socioeconomic inequalities often exacerbated by neoliberal policies a unifying theme 
throughout the left in Latin America (see discussion in Baker and Greene 2009; 
Cameron 2009; Stokes 2009). However, we also see that in Chile the contribution of this 
dimension is less substantial, which is attributable to the circumstance that since 
democratization the socioeconomic incorporation of previously excluded sectors did 
expand significantly (Luna and Filgueira 2009). It is therefore important to recognize 
such country-specific political contexts and to seek variations along these lines. 
In general, then, the total of the six substantive policy dimensions examined here 
improve our ability to predict parties’ and presidents’ placements on the left-right 
dimension in each of the 18 countries under investigation. In more than two-thirds of the 
countries placements on these six dimensions explain a large part (75–98 percent) of the 
variation in placements of the same actors on the overall left-right. But we also see a 
huge variation in the substantive correlates of left-right across the Latin American 
region. In some countries left-right positions seem to be best reflected by a combination 
of a variety of dimensions. In others the impact of economic issues dominates, whereas 
in a country like Panama social policy is effectively the only substantive policy 
dimension that significantly predicts left-right expert judgments.  
To return to our running example of Uruguay and Paraguay, we see that in 
Uruguay the religious dimension is not an independent significant component of expert 
judgments on the left-right axis at all, whereas economic policies clearly dominate. Yet, 
in Panama and Paraguay, two countries where social and religious issues contribute most 
to the meaning of left and right, the inclusion of environmental policy and globalization 
did not add much predictive power. It might be that in some countries even more 
specific issues are necessary to capture what country specialists had in mind in 
substantive terms when they placed parties and presidents on the overall left-right scale. 
For instance, adding the policy dimension of promotion of minority rights to the 
weighted OLS regression for Paraguay leads to a notable improvement of the variation 
we can explain on the left-right (from 46 percent to now 66 percent). The impact of the 
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religious dimension declines, while the independent impact of policy positions on the 
minority dimension emerges as the most important predictor. A very similar pattern can 
be seen in the case of Panama with the inclusion of the dimension measuring positioning 
on the security vs. individual liberties dimension. The coefficient of social policy 
declines dramatically and the security dimension is now the most important predictor.13 
Likewise, the minority dimension contributes significantly to left-right in Brazil, as 
does—not surprisingly—the security question in El Salvador, where the issue of gang 
criminality constitutes a major concern. Researchers using the one-dimensional 
representation of left-right in comparative studies should keep in mind such differences 
when moving across countries. 
EXPERTS VS. ALTERNATIVE LEFT-RIGHT ESTIMATES  
 
The preceding section explored the substantive policy content of the overall left-right 
dimension in each of the 18 Latin American countries using estimates derived by asking 
country specialists to judge positions of parties and presidents on a set of specific policy 
dimensions and a direct measure of positioning on the general left-right. Of course, there 
are other sources that can be used to estimate policy positions of political actors, and we 
can assess the validity of our expert estimates by comparing them against existing left-
right measures generated by an alternative approach. At the end of the day, experts 
should not conceptualize left and right in such a different way as to cause their 
evaluations to diverge starkly from these other measurement instruments (see also 
Benoit and Laver 2007).  
One alternative measurement for assessing positions of parties and presidents on 
the general left-right in Latin American countries comes from elite surveys of party 
politicians. I will use data from the Parliamentary Elites in Latin America (PELA) project 
of the University of Salamanca concentrating on legislative years between 2002 and 
2007, that is, the most recent wave available and closest to the time the expert survey 
was deployed. I focus on politicians’ judgments made about other parties in congress 
rather than their own positions and thus use them in a sense as experts to evaluate 
positions of parties and—where possible—presidents (see also Steenbergen and Marks 
2007). Although the survey did not explicitly include the figure of the president, the 
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Salamanca questionnaire asked representatives to rank some political leaders, which in 
two-thirds of the countries did include the head of state.14  
Using the data in this way has several advantages. Frequently elite surveys suffer 
from the problem that the sample sizes for minor parties in parliament are necessarily 
small—often too small to be used for statistical inference. Very often marginal parties 
that do not have a large representation in congress, or are not present in congress at all, 
but are nonetheless important for the overall political landscape in a given country (and 
thus for the meaning of left and right) are not even included in the studies. Also 
researchers may have to struggle with low participation rates. However, the evaluation 
of other parties usually does include more parties than typically participate in surveys of 
this kind. Hence, we are able to make direct comparisons between the left-right scores 
for 74 parties and 12 presidents for which both elite survey and expert survey estimates 
exist.15  
We start with a comparison of party positions in the pooled cross-national 
sample. Figure 3 shows the association between the left-right scores from both surveys 
with a simple scatterplot and also plots a fitted linear regression with a 95-percent 
confidence interval. For the ease of inspection, large cross hairs partition the plot into 
four quadrants, intersecting at the mid-point of each scale, and country-party 
abbreviations are used to identify each point. The first impression from this graphical 
representation is more than reassuring: we find very little noise and the two scales 
indeed seem to measure the same thing, with the expert survey estimates of left-right 
positions explaining 82 percent of the variance in the PELA data.16 There is an almost 
perfect linear fit between the two measures and a perfect intersection of the regression 
line through the midpoints (10.5, 5.5) of the two scales.  
However, though it involves only a few cases, we nevertheless find some 
disagreement in the location of some actors. What certainly can be characterized as the 
biggest divergences are cases where both surveys come to completely opposing 
assessments and disagree on whether a president or a party is placed on the left or the 
right of the political landscape. Table 2 identifies all cases classified by this definition 
and lists the outliers we find in the off-diagonal quadrants along with the survey scores, 
the standardized residual, and the year the PELA survey was conducted.  
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FIGURE 3 
 
 
SCATTERPLOT OF PELA LEFT-RIGHT SCORES VERSUS EXPERT  
LEFT-RIGHT ESTIMATES 
 
 
 
 
The overall discrepancies are minimal and the scores for the listed parties are 
consistently very close to the midpoints of the respective measures. Two parties deserve 
a closer examination. PELA locates the Paraguayan Movimiento Patria Querida 
(Beloved Fatherland Movement, MPQ) center-left, whereas the expert survey places this 
party far more to the political right. Because the MPQ only emerged as a movement in 
2002 and was not recognized by the Supreme Tribunal of Electoral Justice until March 
2004, it is possible that the PELA score from a poll conducted in 2003 differs from the 
corresponding expert survey estimates. Most political observers, however, characterize 
this party as liberal conservative, center-right, or neoliberal right wing. 
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TABLE 2 
 
 
DIVERGENCES BETWEEN EXPERT SURVEY AND PELA SCORES FOR 
LEFT-RIGHT POSITIONS 
 
 
Country Party Left-Right Score 
   
Expert 
survey 
 
PELA 
 
Standardized 
residual 
 
PELA 
year 
Expert survey says right, PELA says left 
Panama President 
Torrijos 
11.33 5.42 –0.44 2002 
Dominican Republic PLD 11.71 5.28 –0.76 2002 
Ecuador PSP 12.20 5.42 –0.83 2003 
Panama PRD 10.63 4.64 –0.96 2002 
Costa Rica PRC 13.88 5.45 –1.54 2002 
Paraguay MPQ 15.40 5.26 –2.42 2003 
Expert survey says left, PELA says right 
Dominican Republic PRD 9.00 7.05 2.34 2002 
Honduras PINU 8.67 5.74 1.09 2002 
Honduras PDC 10.00 5.93 0.69 2002 
 
 
We observe a disagreement in the opposite direction for the Partido 
Revolucionario Dominicano (Dominican Revolutionary Party, PRD), which is placed on 
the left by our experts but on the right by parliamentary respondents. Historically, this 
party always had the sympathy of social institutions such as unions or students that 
defended a moderate left-wing, social-democratic position. Taking into account 
politicians’ perception of their own party collected by the Salamanca team, we can see 
that the PRD seemingly oscillates in the political center, with associated left-right means 
(year of survey) of 5.1 (1996), 4.87 (2000), and 6.38 (2002) on a 10-point scale. In other 
words, if we take a slightly different perspective, both measures agree to a large extent 
upon the centrist character of the political actors listed in the above table.  
 Another way to evaluate the expert survey results is to focus on the comparison 
of the left-right scales within each country. Table 3 uses ordinal information and 
compares the ordering of political actors from left to right in each country using the 
scores from the expert surveys and the PELA elite surveys along with two measures of 
ordinal association. Whereas Kendall’s tau-a measures the likelihood of agreement of 
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the orderings vs. the likelihood of disagreement and ranges from –1.0 to 1.0, Spearman’s 
rho is an ordinal measure of correlation.  
 
 
TABLE 3 
 
 
WITHIN-COUNTRY COMPARISONS OF EXPERT SURVEY AND PELA RANKINGS 
 
Countr
y 
N Party ordering from left to right 
 
Kendall’s 
tau a 
Spearman’s 
rho 
  Expert survey PELA   
CHL 6 PC PH PS Pres PPD PRSD PDC 
PRI RN UDI 
PS PPD PRSD PDC RN 1 1 
COL 3 PDA ASI AICO PL MIRA MAL 
PCC PCR PSC ALAS Partido-U 
Pres 
PDA PCC Pres 1 1 
HND 5 PUD PINU PDC PLH Pres PNH PUD PINU PDC PLH 
PNH 
1 1 
MEX 7 PRD PT PASC Convergencia 
PRI PANAL PVEM Pres PAN 
PRD PT Convergencia 
PRI PVEM Pres PAN 
1 1 
VEN 5 PCV Pres MVR PPT Podemos 
MAS AD UNT COPEI PJ 
Pres MVR MAS AD 
COPEI 
1 1 
BRA 6 PSOL PCdoB PT PV PSB Pres 
PDT PPS PMDB PSDB PTB PL 
PSC PP PFL 
PT PMDB PTB PFL PP 0.87 0.94 
ECU 6 MPD MIAJ PS-FA MUPP-NP 
Pres ID PRE UDC PSP PRIAN 
PSC 
MUPP-NP ID PSP PRE 
PRIAN PSC 
0.87 0.94 
NIC 5 FSLN MRS Pres AC PRN ALN 
PCN PLC 
Pres FSLN PRN PCN 
PLC  
0.8 0.9 
SLV 5 FMLN CD PDC Pres PCN 
ARENA 
FMLN PDC PCN Pres 
ARENA 
0.8 0.9 
CRI 6 FA PAC PASE PLN PRN PUN 
Pres PRC PUSC PML 
PAC PRC PLN Pres 
PUSC PML 
0.73 0.83 
PRY 6 PPS PEN PLRA Pres MPQ 
ANR-PC PUNACE 
PPS MPQ PLRA Pres 
ANR-PC PUNACE 
0.73 0.83 
PAN 7 PRD Pres PP SOLID PLN 
MOLIRENA Partido-Pa PCD 
PRD Pres PP Partido-
Pa SOLID PLN 
MOLIRENA 
0.71 0.76 
URY 5 FA-EP-NM Pres PI PN PC UC FA-EP-NM Pres UC PN 
PC  
0.6 0.7 
BOL 3 MAS Pres UN PODEMOS MNR Pres MAS MNR 0.33 0.5 
PER 3 PNP UPP FDC PAP(APRA) AP 
Pres RN PP SN AF PPC 
PAP(APRA) UPP PP 0.33 0.5 
GTM 4 ANN EG UNE DCG UCN PAN 
PU FRG Pres GANA PP 
DCG Pres PAN FRG 0.33 0.4 
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Note: Parties in italic are parties that were only included in the expert survey. Parties in bold are cases 
were the ranking differs. Pres stands for President. N indicates the number of parties for which both expert 
survey and PELA estimates exist. 
In general the agreement is quite high. In 5 of the 18 Latin American countries 
both sources of positions on the general left-right dimension agree perfectly on the 
ranking. In the case of Brazil for instance, where only the order of the PFL and the PP 
are swapped, Kendall’s tau-a indicates that both ranks are 87 percent more likely to 
agree than to disagree. In sum, we can confidently conclude that the cross-validation 
between left-right scores from our expert survey and those gathered by an alternative 
approach, namely elite surveys, is reassuring.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Using policy positions of political parties and presidents derived from a recent expert 
survey, this paper has explored the substantive meaning of left and right in Latin 
American countries. First, a comparison of expert judgments of presidential positioning 
on the general left-right dimension confirmed rather considerable spaces among actors 
usually lumped together in distinct groups of the left. Second, a two-dimensional 
description of the general left-right further illustrated difficulties we may face when we 
try to locate actors on the one-dimensional axis of left-right. Third, building on work of 
Wiesehomeier and Benoit (2009), the exploratory analysis reveals interesting facets of 
the substantive meanings of left and right in each country. Economic policy interpreted 
as a trade-off between lower taxes and higher public spending typically adds little to our 
ability to predict left-right placements, and the social policy dimension gives rather 
mixed results. On the other hand, the combined deregulation/privatization dimension 
emerges as a major predictor of positioning on the left and right, together with the 
globalization dimension, which more than emphasizing interventionist government 
economic policy focuses on consequences of globalization. Interestingly, in a number of 
countries environmental policy is a significant component of the substantive meaning of 
left and right, and the influence of religion as a distinguishing factor is also confirmed. 
Finally, a direct comparison of the left-right expert placements with placements on the 
same scale derived from elite surveys shows a striking overlap between both measures, 
which validates the usefulness of our data. 
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 These findings directly address the most recent debates in the comparative study 
of Latin American politics that evolve around the so-called left turn. By and large the 
regression results show considerable consistency across countries concerning the 
direction of the associations between experts’ placements of parties and presidents on 
substantive policy dimensions and experts’ placements of the same actors on the overall 
left-right. However, the results also confirm that the contributions to the general left-
right of the individual dimensions examined by this analysis vary when we move from 
country to country. Countries are far from forming uniform clusters—either across the 
region or across different subgroups of the left.  
Differences among countries in the substantive meaning of left and right and the 
associated concern about lack of comparability come as no surprise to students of other 
regions (Benoit and Laver 2006). So far, however, such differences had not been 
demonstrated in the case of Latin American democracies.  In light of ongoing research 
aimed at either typology building of the left or cross-country comparisons that involve 
the evaluation of policy positions on the general left-right, scholars should be mindful of 
the contexts they study and the implications for their explanations (Falleti and Lynch 
2009). This is not to say that cross-country studies of Latin America are impossible. For 
instance, the claim that, rather than voters’ aversion to markets themselves, social 
consequences resulting from neoliberal policies can explain the rise of the left could be 
examined directly by using well-defined policy dimensions. Scholarly recognition of the 
importance to the substantive meaning of left and right in the region of such policy 
dimensions, which reflect local peculiarities of development and do not necessarily form 
part of our preconceived definitions of “left” and “right,” will hopefully lead to more in-
depth studies of country-specific conditions. 
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APPENDIX 
 
 Questionnaire Respondents 
Country Language Format 
Total 
Parties 
Total 
Dimen-
sions 
Total 
Respon-
dents 
Total 
Surveyed 
Response 
Rate (%) 
Argentina Spanish Web 14 11 38 114 33% 
Bolivia Spanish Web 4 12 16 59 27% 
Brazil Portuguese Web 14 11 41 135 30% 
Chile Spanish Web 9 12 24 56 43% 
Columbia Spanish Web 11 12 16 59 27% 
Costa Rica Spanish Web 9 12 16 43 37% 
Dominican 
Republic Spanish Web 3 10 9 31 29% 
Ecuador Spanish Web 10 12 8 54 15% 
El 
Salvador Spanish Web 5 11 13 31 42% 
Guatemala Spanish Web 10 12 11 36 31% 
Honduras Spanish Web 5 12 4 20 20% 
Mexico Spanish Web 8 12 25 74 34% 
Nicaragua Spanish Web 7 12 11 41 27% 
Panama Spanish Web 7 12 9 28 32% 
Paraguay Spanish Web 6 10 10 29 34% 
Peru Spanish Web 10 11 13 46 28% 
Uruguay Spanish Web 5 9 18 33 55% 
Venezuela Spanish Web 9 12 23 77 30% 
Totals   146 
different 
parties 
 305 total 
valid 
responses 
966 
experts 
surveyed 
Mean 
response 
rate 32% 
Note: Plus eighteen presidents in office at the time the surveys were deployed. 
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ENDNOTES 
 
1 The data are available on the author’s homepage, www.wiesehomeier.net. 
2 A thorough discussion of the advantages of expert surveys lies beyond the scope of this 
paper. For an overview see Benoit and Wiesehomeier (2009). For more details on the survey 
see the Appendix. 
3 In general, Wiesehomeier and Benoit’s basic methodology closely matches, and actually can 
be viewed as an extension of, the expert surveys presented in Benoit and Laver (2006). 
4 The questionnaires were translated into the native language of the country under 
investigation. Each substantive policy scale was given a precise title and the scale endpoints 
were given a precise substantive definition. The exact text wording was as follows. Economic: 
“Promotes raising taxes to increase public services (1). Promotes cutting public services to cut 
taxes (20).” Social: “Favors (1)/Opposes (20) liberal policies on matters such as abortion, 
homosexuality, [in-vitro fertilization], divorce, and euthanasia.” Decentralization: “Promotes 
(1)/Opposes (20) decentralization of all administration and decision-making.” Environment: 
“Supports protection of the environment, even at the cost of economic growth (1). Supports 
economic growth, even at the cost of damage to the environment (20).” In the case of social 
policy, the Benoit-Laver wording was adapted to the Latin American context by adding the 
topic of divorce which was originally not included. In-vitro fertilization was added in the case 
of Costa Rica. 
5 For the Latin American core dimensions the wording was as follows: Religion: “Supports 
secular (1)/religious (20) principles in politics.” Globalization: “Opposed to (1)/Favorable 
towards (20) all consequences of globalization.” Regional Economic Cooperation: “Favors 
(1)/Rejects (20) closer ties to regional organizations or treaties of economic cooperation that 
may impose binding regulations on _____ trade.” Deregulation: “Favors high levels of state 
regulation and control of the market (1).” “Favors deregulation of markets at every opportunity 
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(20).” Privatization: “Promotes maximum (1)/Opposes all (20) state ownership of business and 
industry, such as gas, oil, electricity, and telecommunications.” The latter two dimensions were 
applied in a mutually exclusive fashion, meaning that when one was included, the other was 
omitted from the questionnaire. In the following, these dimensions are treated as equivalent 
and combined. 
6 Presumably, with the election of Fernando Lugo in Paraguay and Mauricio Funes in El 
Salvador the division would be reversed, rendering the Guardian’s claim that “left-of-center 
governments…now outnumber right-of-centre administrations” (12/4/2006) now more 
appropriate. Even so, the regional mean would not be affected too heavily.  
7 During Kirchner’s time in office this assessment changed and he was ascribed to the group of 
moderate left presidents. Furthermore it should be acknowledged that this is not the only 
clustering we could consider here. Especially at the beginning Lula’s ascendancy was closely 
observed to see how this “populist” would affect the Brazilian economy.  
8 Wiesehomeier and Benoit (2009) show that the dimension of deregulation/privatization is by 
far more important in Latin American countries than the more traditional taxes vs. spending 
dimension of economic policy. 
9 Together with a second factor, 60 percent of the variance in the underlying policy dimensions 
is explained. 
10 The only exception is the—statistically insignificant—social policy coefficient in Costa 
Rica. 
11 The only other country where this is the case is Panama. 
12 From results not reported here we know that this pattern does not change even when 
additional policy dimensions such as the minority question are added. 
13 Due to space limitations these results are not displayed here, but they are available upon 
request. 
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14 The exact question used for the placement of political parties is “Cuando se habla de política 
se utilizan normalmente las expresiones izquierda y derecha. En una escala donde el 1 es la 
izquierda y el 10 la derecha, ¿en qué casilla colocaría Ud. a los siguientes partidos o 
coaliciones?” and for presidents, if available, the direct follow-up question is “Y, en esta 
misma escala, ¿dónde situaría Ud. a los siguientes líderes políticos?”  
15 Since in the Argentine case we explicitly asked for faction, this country is excluded from the 
validation test. The number of respondents in the PELA surveys ranges from N=31 to N=121 
per country-party item. 
16 The OLS regression yielded the following results: N=86, R2=0.82, Root MSE=0.94, Expert 
Survey Coefficient (SE) 0.416 (0.18), Constant 1.11 (0.26).  
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